Missouri Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 1

Article 9

Winter 2022

Risky Business: Breakfast Sandwiches, Course of Employment,
and Revisiting Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law
Trent H. Hamoud

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Trent H. Hamoud, Risky Business: Breakfast Sandwiches, Course of Employment, and Revisiting Missouri
Workers’ Compensation Law, 87 MO. L. REV. ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

NOTE
Risky Business: Breakfast Sandwiches,
Course of Employment,
and Revisiting Missouri Workers’
Compensation Law
Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc., No. SD 36408, 2020 WL 7706398 (Mo. Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 2020), rev’d en banc, 637 S.W.3d 45 (Mo. 2021).
Trent H. Hamoud*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Missouri Workers’ Compensation scheme has
presented interesting and complex problems regarding workplace risk
allocation. To avoid workplace injuries, employees and employers engage
in significant preventative behaviors. One such action by employers is
employee monitoring. Clearly, however, constant workplace monitoring
is not feasible. This inherent limitation leads to this Note’s initial inquiry:
at what point do the actions of employees taken out of sight of their
employers create compensable claims under the existing Missouri
Workers’ Compensation system, and what inefficiencies may result from
requiring that employers provide compensation for the injuries that arise
from such actions? Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc. provided a new
perspective on this question while evaluating an employee’s claim
deriving from a vehicular accident.
Part II of this Note summarizes the facts and procedural background
of Boothe’s employment dispute in Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc. Part III
outlines the legal background relevant to the ruling of the Missouri Court
of Appeals, providing a brief primer on pertinent workers’ compensation,
scope of employment, and economic principles. Part IV details the Boothe
court’s divided ruling, which ultimately held that the “risk source directly
leading to [Boothe’s] injuries [was] the inherent road and driving
conditions of his employment[.]” 1 Part V evaluates relevant takeaways,
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discusses various business and societal impacts, and opines on future
consequences of the decision on Missouri employment law.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff Gary Boothe served as an installer/service technician for
Defendant DISH Network, Inc. (“DISH”) since 2006.2 To make service
calls, Boothe drove a van issued by DISH.3 Boothe drove the van during
work hours, and after work, he drove it back to his home near Licking,
Missouri.4 Four towns – St. Clair, Potosi, Iberia, and Richland – bordered
Boothe’s service territory.5 Thus, Boothe often traveled on Interstate 44,
two-lane state highways, and country roads to reach customers’ homes.6
Boothe was the only DISH employee assigned to this service territory.7
During Boothe’s four-day workweek, DISH required him to first
check in between 7:10 and 7:15 a.m. to obtain his daily route and required
list of equipment.8 With only fifteen minutes to load his van, Boothe was
expected to leave his home by 7:35 a.m. so he could arrive to his first
customer appointment at approximately 8:00 a.m.9
The morning of Sunday, July 23, 2017, began much like any other
routine work morning for Boothe.10 After checking his work schedule at
7:15 a.m. and discovering that his first appointment was in Plato, Missouri,
a thirty to forty-five minute drive, Boothe departed his home at 7:26 a.m. 11
Boothe purchased two packs of cigarettes, a soda, and a breakfast
sandwich at a convenience store approximately six miles from his home
and twenty-four miles from Plato.12 Boothe left the convenience store at
about 7:41 a.m.13 Six minutes later, at 7:47 a.m. and less than a mile away

Review. I would like to thank Professor Rigel C. Oliveri, Isabelle Wade and Paul C.
Lyda Professor of Law, for her insight, guidance, and support in writing this Note, as
well as the rest of the Missouri Law Review for their help in the writing and editing
process. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their endless love, support, and
encouragement.
1
Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc., No. SD 36408, 2020 WL 7706398, at *3 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2020), rev’d en banc, 637 S.W.3d 45 (Mo. 2021).
2
Id. at *1–2.
3
Id. at *2.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.

2022]

REVISITING MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

231

from the convenience store, Boothe choked on his breakfast sandwich
while driving.14 Upon blacking out, Boothe crashed into a short pillar near
the side of Highway 32.15 Boothe’s body hit a pole in the middle of the
van, resulting in injuries to his back and neck.16
Notably, DISH had a safety rule prohibiting employees from eating
or drinking while driving, a rule that Booth was aware of. 17 The record
further reflects that DISH issued Boothe a distracted driving warning in
2014, in part for eating and drinking.18
DISH denied Boothe compensation for his injuries, arguing that he
did not make the requisite showing that his injuries arose “out of and in
the course of his employment” as required under Missouri Revised
Statutes (“RSMo”) § 287.020.3(2).19 Boothe’s workers’ compensation
claim for past and future medical treatment and disability was granted by
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), subject to a thirty percent penalty,
due to Boothe’s violation of DISH’s safety rule.20 The Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission, in a 2-1 split decision, reversed the
ALJ’s ruling, determining that the “risk source” was Boothe’s decision to
eat breakfast while driving.21 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Southern District again reversed, finding DISH was liable and remanding
to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission.22 The appellate court
held that the “risk source directly leading to [Boothe’s] injuries [was] the
inherent road and driving conditions of his employment[.]”23

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id. Specifically, “[a]ccording to medical records, Boothe suffered ‘cervicalthoracic injury, lumbar strain, concussion, [and] right flank and chest contusions’ as
the result of his single-van accident.” Id. at *2, n.2.
17
Id. at *2.
18
Id.
19
Id. at *1.
20
Id. at *2.
21
Id.
22
Id. at *3.
23
Id. On transfer from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District,
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Boothe’s injuries did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment. See Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc., 637 S.W.3d 45
(Mo. 2021) (en banc), reh'g denied (Feb. 8, 2022). In an opinion authored by Judge
Mary R. Russell, the court determined that “Boothe’s injury’s risk source was eating
while driving, which created a risk of choking and led to the accident resulting in
injury.” Id. Specifically, as applied to RSMo § 287.020.3(2)(b), the court found eating
while driving unrelated to Boothe’s employment. Id. Rejecting the arguments that
Boothe’s tight schedule, limited ability to eat lunch, and the nature of the roads he was
driving on contributed to the accident, the court reasoned that “DISH did not require
him to eat breakfast after starting work for the day, and, as Boothe acknowledged, he
could have had breakfast [before leaving for his shift.]” Id. The court also concluded
that Boothe failed to establish that he was not equally exposed to eating while driving
15
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part begins by introducing workers’ compensation law generally
and in Missouri. Next, it examines basic scope-of-employment principles.
Finally, it concludes by providing a brief overview of agency costs and
relevant economic principles.

A. Workers’ Compensation
Missouri Workers’ Compensation law traces its roots to 1925 with
the passage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (“the Act”).24 Before
this point, employees could seek to recover from their employers for
workplace injuries under the common law theory of negligence, but
defenses such as the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence often barred recovery.25 Under this strict regime,
the employee had to show “the accident resulted solely from the
employer’s negligence,” leading to paltry recovery rates by employees.26
While the overarching purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
was to “place upon industry the losses sustained by employees resulting
from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment,” the Act
signifies a compromise between employers and employees, much like

in nonemployment life, citing a misplaced reliance on the absence of evidence by
Boothe in an effort to make the necessary showing under RSMo § 287.020.3(2)(b).
Id. (noting that Boothe “allege[d] that he [ate] meals at home on his days off and that
no evidence demonstrated he [ate] while driving outside of work.”). Finally, the court
referenced a number of recent Supreme Court of Missouri opinions supporting
affirmation of the Commission’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits. Id. (citing
Schoen v. Mid-Missouri Mental Health Ctr., 597 S.W.3d 657, 660–61 (Mo. 2020) (en
banc); Annayeva v. SAB of TSD of City of St. Louis, 597 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Mo.
2020) (en banc); Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 511–12 (Mo.
2012) (en banc); and Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671,
674 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)).
24
Breanna Hance, "Equal Exposure" Brews Frustration for Employees: Court
Filters Personal Comfort Doctrine Through Workers' Compensation Amendments
Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. 2012) (En Banc), 78 MO.
L. REV. 573, 579 n.54 (2013).
25
Id. To prevent the ability of an employee to sue an employer for injuries
deriving from a co-employee’s negligence, an exception to the doctrine of respondeat
superior arose known as the “fellow servant” rule, “holding an employer was not
liable for an employee’s injury resulting from the negligence of a co-employee.”
Connor v. Ogletree, 542 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (citing McDermott v.
Pac. R. Co., 30 Mo. 115, 116 (Mo. 1860)) (“[A] servant, who is injured by the
negligence or misconduct of his fellow servant, can maintain no action against the
master for such injury.”).
26
Hance, supra note 24, at 579–80 (quoting Bass v. Nat'l Super Markets, Inc.,
911 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)) (emphasis added).
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insurance.27 Indeed, in exchange for the removal of the threat of suit and
potentially more costly damages, employers promise to compensate
employees for their workplace injuries, capped at a fixed amount and only
in a well-defined set of circumstances, under a theory of strict liability. 28
Under this scheme, employers may have to pay out claims more
frequently, but face reduced risk exposure.29 Conversely, employees trade
maximum collection potential for a higher probability of recovery.30 Both
parties benefit from more efficient resolution of workplace disputes.31
For a Missouri worker to succeed on a workers’ compensation claim,
she must show that the injury “has arisen out of and in the course of
employment.”32 The Missouri Legislature provides that an injury arises
out of and in the course of employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the
circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the
injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment
to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and
unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.33

For decades, a series of common law doctrines, such as the personal
comfort doctrine, were invoked to interpret the “arising out of and in the
course of employment” element.34 Under the personal comfort doctrine,
“certain unavoidable acts that minister to [a worker’s] personal comfort
are considered ‘incidental’ to his or her employment when committed at
work.”35 The advent of the new workers’ compensation system, however,

27

Id. at 580–81 (2013) (quoting Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., Inc., 646
S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1983)).
28
Id. at 581.
29
Id. at 580–81.
30
Id. at 581.
31
Id.
32
MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(1) (2017).
33
MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3(2) (2017).
34
Hance, supra note 24, at 583.
35
Id. at 583. “The inevitable facts of human beings in ministering to their
personal comfort while at work, such as seeking warmth and shelter, heeding a call of
nature, satisfying thirst and hunger, washing, resting or sleeping, and preparing to
begin or quit work, are held to be incidental to the employment under the personal
comfort doctrine.” Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Mo.
1999) (overturned due to legislative action 2005) (citing Bell v. Arthur's Fashions,
Inc., 858 S.W.2d 760, 763–64 (Mo.App.1993); Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 920 S.W.2d
534, 537 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)).
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substantially eroded such an expansive interpretation of the personal
comfort doctrine.36
In 2005, Missouri made significant legislative amendments to its
workers’ compensation law.37 Specifically, the legislature modified the
relevant standard of review and included a further instruction regarding
the “arising out of and in the course of employment” element.38 Strict,
rather than liberal construction under the prior statute, is now required.39
Judges and commissioners are also now instructed to “weigh the evidence
impartially without giving a benefit to either party.”40 Thus, under the
2005 amendments, employees must carry a heavier burden.41 Finally, the
amendments also narrowed the scope of the “arising out of and in the
course of employment” requirement by further refining the types of acts
that did or did not fall within this requirement.42
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District developed a
two-part, causal-connection test.43 First, a worker must correctly identify
the risk source or injury-causing activity.44 If a worker succeeds in that
identification, the court then compares that risk source or activity to
nonemployment life.45 In other words, the central inquiry becomes
whether or not the employee would have been equally exposed to a
particular risk outside of the workplace.46
In Miller v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, a road
repair crew member felt his knee pop while walking briskly toward a truck
to retrieve repair materials – his knee later required surgery.47 The
Supreme Court of Missouri denied the crew member’s workers’
compensation claim on the theory that “his work did not require him to
walk in an unusually brisk way” and the risk involved – walking – was

36

Hance, supra note 24, at 585.
See S.B. 1 & 130, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005).
38
Hance, supra note 24, at 586.
39
Id.
40
Id. “Prior to the 2005 amendments, the act's provisions were required to be
construed liberally in favor of compensation. § 287.800, RSMo 2000.” Miller v. Mo.
Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
41
Hance, supra note 24, at 586–87.
42
Id. at 587.
43
Id. at 590.
44
Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc., No. SD 36408, 2020 WL 7706398, at *3 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2020), rev’d en banc, 637 S.W.3d 45 (Mo. 2021) (quoting Gleason
v. Treasurer of Missouri-Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 455 S.W.3d 494, 499,
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
45
Id.
46
Id. (quoting Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Mo.
2012) (en banc 2012).
47
Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 671–72 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
37
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“one to which the worker would have been exposed equally in normal nonemployment life.”48
In Pile v. Lake Regional Health Systems, a registered nurse
underwent surgery on her foot after she stumbled on a carpet and turned
her ankle and foot while moving quickly out of a patient’s room. 49 She
was later diagnosed with chronic tendonitis in her foot, which the court
found to be consistent with prolonged walking as required by her job.50
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District reversed the
Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s denial of workers’
compensation benefits, finding that the risk to the nurse was not walking,
but rather “the risk of tendonitis due to prolonged walking.” 51 Moreover,
the Court held that the nurse was not equally exposed to this hazard or risk
while not working as a registered nurse.52

B. Scope of Employment
Principles of agency and tort are helpful for illustrating various scope
of employment doctrines. Agency is a fiduciary relationship between two
parties wherein one acts on behalf of the other.53 The agent is an individual
who acts on behalf of the principal.54
An employer-employee relationship is a type of agency relationship
and exists where an employee agrees to both work on behalf of an
employer and be subject to the employer’s control or right to control the
“physical conduct” of the employee.55 This means that the central inquiry
is the manner in which the job is being performed, as opposed to what the
job is trying to accomplish.56
This Note’s focus is on the duties owed by principals directly to their
agents with respect to workers’ compensation. Nevertheless, traditional
tort and agency law related to a principal’s liability to third parties for the
actions of her agents illustrates the classical scope-of-employment
doctrines relevant to the two-part workers’ compensation test explored
above.57 For a tort to reside within the scope of employment, three
requirements must usually be satisfied: (1) it is the type of action the

48

Id. at 674.
Pile v. Lake Reg'l Health Sys., 321 S.W.3d 463, 464–65 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
50
Id. at 465.
51
Id. at 468.
52
Id. at 467–68.
53
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
54
Id.
55
See id. §§ 1–2. Employees are distinguished from independent contractors,
who can be both agents and non-agents. See id. § 2(3).
56
See id. § 1–2.
57
See id. § 219.
49
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employee is employed to perform, (2) it is within the authorized
time/space limitations for the employment, and (3) it is committed with a
purpose to serve the employer - alternatively, it was foreseeable.58 The
Restatement (Second) of Agency also provides insight as to the types of
conduct that may be said to reside within the scope of employment.59
Notably, for the purposes of respondeat superior liability in Missouri,
“[w]hether an act was committed within the scope and course of
employment is not measured by the time or motive of the conduct, but
whether it was done by virtue of the employment and in furtherance of the
business or interest of the employer.”60

C. Agency Costs
Finally, agency costs and other relevant economic principles help
frame the employment issues addressed in Boothe. Agency costs are
welfare losses borne from agency or like relationships.61 Workers’
compensation claims paid by employers that arise out of sub-optimal
decision making by employees – agents – are one type of agency cost.62
Agency relationships require a separation of ownership and control.63
For example, in Boothe, DISH owned the company van, but Boothe was
often responsible for controlling it.64 DISH collects the subsequent value
generated by the productive resources it owns, such as the company van
See id. § 228. “Purpose” is often commonly understood to be fairly liberally
construed, thereby suggesting leniency with its application. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc.
v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). While the Restatement’s “purpose to
serve the employer” approach presents the majority view, the classical case Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), illustrates the
substantial minority approach by substituting the third prong of § 228 with a
foreseeability approach (i.e., was the conduct by the employee foreseeable). Since
“purpose to serve the employer” is a subjective inquiry, as viewed from the agent’s
state of mind, the Bushey approach has a somewhat greater appeal from an analytical
standpoint by eliminating such a difficult inquiry.
59
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
60
Cluck v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 367 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)
(quoting Daugherty v. Allee's Sports Bar & Grill, 260 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008) (emphasis removed)). “Respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability on
employers for the negligent acts or omissions of employees or agents as long as the
acts or omissions are committed within the scope of the employment or agency.”
Indep. Living Ctr. of Mid MO, Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., MO HealthNet Div., 391
S.W.3d 52, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Papa John's USA, Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 366 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Mo.App. W.D.2012)).
61
See THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS
94 (2017).
62
See discussion infra Part V, Section B.
63
See LAMBERT, supra note 61, at 94.
64
Boothe v. DISH Network, Inc., No. SD 36408, 2020 WL 7706398, at *2 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2020), rev’d en banc, 637 S.W.3d 45 (Mo. 2021).
58
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and Boothe’s labor.65 DISH also clearly determined that it was most
efficient for Boothe to drive the van to and from his home.66
Problems arise, however, when unfaithful agents do not put
productive resources to their optimal use, resulting in allocative
inefficiencies.67 In order to curb these inefficiencies, principals often
expend significant resources, including through supervision, to minimize
resulting losses to social welfare.68 Agents may even expend resources
themselves to prove that they are not in fact unfaithful to their principals.69
This results in further waste and inefficiency. Therefore, taken together,
agency costs are the sum of (1) monitoring costs, (2) costs expended by
agents to prove their faithfulness, and (3) allocative inefficiencies that
nonetheless result when agents act unfaithfully.70
The following example focuses primarily on the third prong. For
example, consider a workplace vehicular accident due to an unfaithful act
by the agent that results in a workers’ compensation claim that is
significant enough to cause a supply-side “shock” to the market.71
Allocative inefficiencies are numerous – the payout on the workers’
compensation claim, damage to the company property, and loss of labor
due to the injury to the employee.72 Because the principal-employer must
expend resources to address these problems, all else being equal, fewer
resources remain to produce the same level of output at the same price.73
Under a standard economic analysis, these allocative inefficiencies have
the effect of creating what is known as an efficiency or deadweight loss,74
depicted in the following graph by the shaded region:

65

Id.; see LAMBERT, supra note 61, at 94.
Boothe, 2020 WL 7706398, at *2.
67
See LAMBERT, supra note 61, at 94 (defining allocative inefficiencies as where
“[p]roductive resources are moved away from the use in which they would produce
the most value and toward some use that maximizes the controlling agent’s welfare.”).
68
See id. at 95.
69
See id.
70
See id. at 95–96.
71
One might wonder what an unfaithful act amounts to. This might be an
employee that takes a frolic and goes a block out of her way to pick up her dry cleaning
while using the company vehicle. Or a more subtle illustration might see an employee
that allows himself to daydream on the job, thus diverting his attention away from the
task at hand. By a supply-side “shock” to the market, this is meant to indicate a
situation resulting in a constraint on supply or disruption to production, followed by a
resultant increase in price for a particular good or service. See LAMBERT, supra note
61, at 94.
72
It is important to keep in mind that the inefficiencies described here arise from
the unfaithful act by the employee, not from the workers’ compensation system.
73
See LAMBERT, supra note 61, at 94.
74
See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 381 (9th ed. 2015).
Deadweight loss is commonly seen in the study of monopolies. Id. A monopolist who
66
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Figure 175
Figure 1 reflects the market supply and demand curves. The supply
curve shifts from S1 to S2 due to the payout on the workers’ compensation
claim, damage to the company property, and loss of labor due to the injury
to the employee.76 With the upward shifting supply curve and a constant
demand curve comes a resultant decrease in equilibrium quantity
demonstrated by the shift from Q1 to Q2 and an increase in equilibrium
price from P1 to P2.77 Another important consequence is the resultant
decrease to consumer surplus and increase to producer surplus – the

charges a single price to all buyers will produce at a lower quantity and sell at a higher
price than would a competitive industry operating under the same cost conditions. Id.
75
Where Quantity (“Q”) is plotted on the horizontal axis and Price (“P”) is
plotted on the vertical axis. Demand (“D”) is the downward-sloping line, whereas the
Supply (“S”) lines are upward sloping. Subscripts “1” and “2” indicate time (“t”) at
t=1 and t=2, respectively. The property known as the law of supply refers to how the
quantity supplied rises as the price of a product rises. Id. at 28. The property often
called the law of demand refers to how the quantity demanded rises as the price of a
product falls. Id. The equilibrium quantity and price refer to the price-quantity pair at
which both buyers and sellers are satisfied, or alternatively, the price-quantity pair at
which the supply and demand schedules intersect. Id. at 29.
76
See id. at 39 (noting that factors that shift a supply curve upward include, but
are not limited to, higher wages, higher prices for raw materials, the expectation of
higher prices, and bad weather). This Note’s Author recognizes that where there is
only one firm in the supposed market, the welfare loss from a single-price monopoly
may alone result in the creation of a deadweight loss. Id. However, the focus in the
present example is on non-optimal production caused by the payout on the workers’
compensation claim, damage to company property, and loss of labor due to the
employee’s injury. Id.
77
See id. at 40.

2022]

REVISITING MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

239

triangular regions above and below, respectively, the horizontal dotted
lines.78
The economic losses borne by the employee resulting from the
agency relationship are also material. Employees have just as great, if not
a greater incentive to ensure their own safety than does the employer.
Because of deadweight loss discussed above, employers have a strong
incentive to shift the economic risk of their activities to their employees.
Workers’ compensation, of course, seeks to create a compromise position
to make these costs more efficient to determine. However, from the
employee’s perspective, such a compromise may result in a sub-optimal
solution. Labor is akin to a perishable good, and if an employee’s
workplace injury keeps him off the job for an extended period, he may not
fully be able to recoup these lost hours and wages.
This example is heavily simplified. If the principal-employer is so
large that it is effectively able to internalize the costs borne by such a
workers’ compensation claim, such as by carrying insurance, or by
maintaining a very large pool of vehicles and employees, then consumers
may not feel the effects of the accident. Similarly, the employee might
carry her own supplementary insurance policy to mitigate a workers’
compensation shortfall. Moreover, this example only looks at one
individual firm. If the firm does not hold, say, a monopoly position, then
consumers, when faced with the prospect of higher prices, will simply shift
their consumption from one good or service to another, assuming the
availability of a suitable substitute, or even cease their consumption
altogether.79 Overall, however, the above example illustrates that under
the right set of circumstances, agency costs can operate to decrease the
total amount of social welfare.80

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Boothe, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the “risk source
directly leading to [Boothe’s] injuries [was] the inherent road and driving
conditions of his employment[.]” 81 This Part examines the principal
opinion’s application of the relevant two-part test, as well as DISH’s
argument that Boothe should be denied compensation for his injuries
because he violated a company rule. Finally, this Part concludes by briefly
examining the concurring and dissenting opinions.

See id. at 144–45, 331–34. Consumer surplus is defined as the “dollar measure
of the extent to which a consumer benefits from participating in a transaction.” Id. at
144. Producer surplus is defined as “the dollar amount by which a firm benefits by
producing a profit-maximizing level of output.” Id. at 331.
79
Id.
80
See LAMBERT, supra note 61, at 94–95.
81
Boothe, 2020 WL 7706398, at *1.
78
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A. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Judge Jeffrey W. Bates,
reversed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s conclusion that
Boothe’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment
because it found that the “risk source directly leading to Boothe’s injuries
[was] the inherent road driving conditions of his employment[.]” 82 In
reaching this conclusion, the court first interpreted RSMo §
287.020.3(2).83
DISH did not challenge the ALJ’s finding that RSMo §
287.020.3(2)(a) was satisfied.84 It did not dispute that Boothe established
that the van accident was the prevailing factor in causing the injuries to his
upper body.85 Rather, Boothe’s appeal regarded interpretation and
subsequent application of RSMo § 287.020.3(2)(b).86
For Boothe to succeed under RSMo § 287.020.3(2)(b), he needed to
satisfy the two-part, causal-connection test.87 This meant identifying the
risk source, or injury-causing activity, and then “compar[ing] [] that risk
source or activity to normal nonemployment life.”88
The court quickly found that Boothe met the first part of the test. 89
The risk source was not Boothe’s act of choking on his breakfast sandwich,
but rather, the van accident.90 Turning to leading Supreme Court of
Missouri cases,91 the court found support in its conclusion that the risk
source tended to be the “immediate cause of injury.”92
82
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Id. (quoting Gleason v. Treasurer of State of Missouri-Custodian of Second
Injury Fund, 455 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
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Id. at *4.
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Id. The court observed that “[t]he van accident caused ‘the violence to the
body structure.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 379, 381
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010)).
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The court next turned to the second prong, and again quickly found
in Boothe’s favor.93 It was undisputed that Boothe’s job required frequent
driving.94 It was also undisputed that during Boothe’s days off from work,
he was not driving as frequently as he was during a usual work week,
instead often staying home and restoring old cars.95 The court concluded
that Boothe was not equally exposed to the risk source in his normal
nonemployment life, and thus “established the requisite ‘causal
connection between the injury at issue and the employee’s work
activity.’”96
Finally, the court disposed of DISH’s argument that since Boothe
violated the company’s rule prohibiting employees from eating or drinking
while driving, Boothe’s conduct could not be said to reside within the
course of his employment.97 The court rejected this argument for two
reasons.98 First, by eating a breakfast sandwich while driving, Boothe
disobeyed a “reasonable rule adopted” by DISH, as distinguished from
conduct cutting “deeper into the relationship of the parties than any mere
rule.”99 In other words, Boothe’s conduct did not completely sever and
terminate the underlying employer-employee relationship.100
Second, the court turned to RSMo § 287.120.5, a Missouri statute
specifically addressing safety-rule violations:
Where the injury is caused by the failure of the employee to use safety
devices where provided by the employer, or from the employee's
failure to obey any reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the
safety of employees, the compensation and death benefit provided for
herein shall be reduced at least twenty-five but not more than fifty
percent; provided, that it is shown that the employee had actual
knowledge of the rule so adopted by the employer; and provided,
further, that the employer had, prior to the injury, made a reasonable
effort to cause his or her employees to use the safety device or devices
and to obey or follow the rule so adopted for the safety of the
employees.101

By the plain text of the statute, the court reasoned that to adopt
DISH’s argument would be to “render § 287.120.5 meaningless.”102
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B. The Concurring Opinion
Judge Daniel E. Scott concurred with the plurality opinion,
concluding simply that the essential condition for Boothe’s injuries was
driving, not eating.103 Judge Scott noted the “ever more [fine]” distinctions
and line drawing required in cases like Boothe, acknowledging that, while
he agreed with the outcome reached by the plurality opinion, reasonable
minds could still differ.104 The concurrence remarked in a footnote that it
would have taken a different route “had Boothe choked to death or claimed
choke-related injuries.”105

C. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Don E. Burrell dissented from the plurality opinion, finding
that the risk source that caused Boothe’s injuries was his act of eating the
breakfast sandwich.106 Judge Burrell explicitly rejected the plurality’s
conclusion that the risk source was the “inherent road and driving
conditions of [Boothe’s] employment.”107 Further, the dissent found fault
with the causal chain of events presented by the plurality opinion. 108 In
the dissent’s view, when Boothe choked on his breakfast sandwich, this
“created an objective symptom of ‘blacking out.’”109 It was only from
Boothe’s blacking out that the work van, now uncontrolled, left the
highway and crashed into the pillar on the side of the road, resulting in
additional personal injuries.110 Therefore, the dissent would have affirmed
the order denying Boothe compensation for his injuries.111

V. COMMENT
This Part first critiques the risk source identifications made by the
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Boothe. Next, this Part
presents the business impact and societal considerations with brief
remarks on possible future impacts of the decision.

Id. at *6 (Scott, J., concurring). Sine qua non is defined as “something
absolutely indispensable or essential.” Sine qua non, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sine%20qua%20non
[https://perma.cc/W3JJ-BC6D] (last accessed Feb. 16, 2021).
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Boothe, 2020 WL 7706398, at *1 (Scott, J., concurring).
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Id. at *6, n.3.
106
Id. at *6 (Burrell, J., dissenting).
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A. Boothe Takeaways
The plurality opinion in Boothe might be seen as taking a significant
step towards expanding the reach of Missouri workers’ compensation.
The case raises questions about how the plurality opinion accords Missouri
precedent. It also raises issues of statutory interpretation, economic
consequences, and other practical concerns. Despite these concerns, the
plurality opinion’s ruling resolves Boothe by minimizing the impact that
could result from the approach taken by the dissent.
Judge Don E. Burrell dissented from the plurality opinion, finding
that the risk source that caused Boothe’s injuries was his act of eating the
breakfast sandwich.112 Rejecting the plurality’s premise that the “inherent
road and driving conditions of [Boothe]’s employment” was the risk
source, Judge Burrell highlighted the plurality’s faulty casual chain of
events.113 In short, per the dissent, eating the breakfast sandwich caused
Boothe to choke, which caused him to blackout, lose control of his work
van, and crash, which resulted in his injuries.114
At first blush, this is an analytically satisfactory framework. In fact,
it may be an even more accurate causal chain than that mapped by the
plurality opinion. Identification of the risk source, then, is clearly the key
difference between the decisions reached by the plurality and the dissent.
In the middle of the risk sources cited by the two opinions, however,
is a combination of the two sources – Boothe’s act of eating the breakfast
sandwich under the inherent road and driving conditions.115 This, it would
seem, would be the middle-ground approach taken by the concurrence.116
Recall that the distinction between the decisions reached in Miller
and Pile was the level of risk exposure outside of the workplace setting.
In Miller, the court determined that the risk involved – walking – was “one
to which the worker would have been exposed equally in normal nonemployment life.”117 In Pile, however, the Court held that the nurse was
not equally exposed to “the risk of tendonitis due to prolonged walking”
while not working as a registered nurse and/or supervising nurse.118
These cases prove useful to addressing the risk-source inquiry faced
in Boothe. The dissent did not inquire into the comparative level of risk
exposure inside and outside of the workplace setting, simply leaving the
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inquiry at the breakfast sandwich.119 The dissent likely figured that Boothe
was just as likely to choke on his breakfast at home as he was at work,
which seems reasonable. However, under the middle-ground approach
hypothesized above, was Boothe equally exposed to the risk of choking on
his breakfast sandwich while driving? The facts don’t support this, as it
was undisputed that during Boothe’s days off from work, he was not
driving as frequently as he was during a usual work week, instead often
staying home and restoring old cars.120
By the holding in Miller, an otherwise non-risky activity must be
viewed within the context of workplace conditions where it is performed.
Walking, by itself, is not risky. Eating, by itself, is not risky. But isolating
otherwise harmless or minimally risky activities, when risk is
compounded, does not seem to be an analytically savory approach in the
employment space. As sharply observed by the concurrence, advocacy
and resolution of Boothe require a splitting of hairs and the opportunity for
reasonable minds to still differ.121 Or more simply put, Boothe is a close
case, but it can be addressed.

B. Business Impacts and Societal Considerations
The decision reached by the plurality opinion has the clear
consequence of expanding business liability. For businesses that cannot
internalize the various costs related to a workers’ compensation claim, this
could result in higher prices and lower output quantities.122 If businesses
shift these higher prices to their employees and consumers to maintain
their bottom line, total societal wealth may decrease.
Is the result fair to employers? The answer to this question is unclear.
While the Boothe result would seem to suggest the answer to this question
is ‘no,’ recall that the original Workmen’s Compensation Act was viewed
as a bargain between employers and employees.123 And under current
Missouri law, an employee’s award may be reduced by at least twentyfive but not more than fifty percent where some degree of fault can be
attributed to the employee.124
Moreover, the plurality opinion raises fundamental questions
regarding human behavior and agency costs. Arguably, the principal
opinion’s decision does not go far enough in encouraging good behavior
on the part of employees and reducing agency costs. Consider that DISH
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had an express rule against eating while driving.125 Not only was Boothe
aware of this rule, but he had received a prior warning about distracted
driving, including eating while driving.126
Fortunately, there exist some remedial options for employers like
DISH to address these problems. DISH could monitor their service
technicians while driving to ensure they are not distracted or breaking
company rules, such as through cameras installed in the vans. Or they
could deploy a more technologically complex driver and occupant
monitoring system.127 Such technology could monitor for driver
distraction, send a warning or alert, and even intervene if necessary.128
Alternatively, DISH could engage in research to modify its
scheduling policies to ensure its technicians have reasonable time to arrive
at their job sites. By inquiring into the type of schedules that seem to lead
employees to eat while driving – early morning jobs, stacked appointments
during the lunch hour without a break, or late evening jobs – DISH could
then modify their workloads accordingly. However, taken together, such
technologies and scheduling policy modifications serve as a perfect
example of significant agency costs directed at monitoring.129 While such
agency costs may result in a marginal decrease in undesirable employee
behavior, they do nothing to ultimately improve the DISH consumer
television experience, thus resulting in a decrease in the total social
welfare.130
The Boothe decision may expand liability for employers in Missouri
under a limited set of defined circumstances. However, in analyzing future
workers’ compensation claims, it is important to consider the balance
between identification of the risk source and the employee’s exposure to
the risk outside of the workplace. As Boothe demonstrates, the risk source
viewed in isolation may be relatively harmless, but when placed within the
greater employment context, may assume a heightened degree of threat.
Finally, Boothe illustrates that when determining the right level of
deterrence, employers must keep a sharp eye on all key stakeholders,
including employees, management, and shareholders, amongst others.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Within a framework of significant interpretations from the Missouri
courts, the plurality opinion in Boothe reversed the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission, finding DISH liable, and holding that the “risk
source directly leading to [Boothe’s] injuries [was] the inherent road and
driving conditions of his employment.”131 Although the court was divided,
the plurality’s findings do raise some issues for employers in light of the
prior decisions in this area and the fact-based nature of the inquiry. In
short, the plurality’s ruling gives Missouri courts limited autonomy to
make a fact-based inquiry about a workplace risk source and the
employee’s exposure to such a risk source outside of the workplace but
should not be taken as fundamentally altering the nature of the “arise out
of and in the course of employment” analysis.132 Regardless, this may well
result in increased burdens for some Missouri employers.
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